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1. INTRODUCTION
It is not possible to read the papers of Mr. Greene and Mr. Pitt,
and their colleagues, without a sense of admiration for their depth of
learning and research. It is, therefore, with some hesitation that one
must approach the task of commenting on their work. This piece is
meant to be comment, and no more, because the state of the subject is
now such that it is hardly possible to do justice to all the issues raised
by them in the confines of a space less than book-length. These issues
include the proper territorial scope of securities legislation; differing
national attitudes to securities regulation; the role and utility of bank-
ing security in the modern world; the impact of foreign blocking legisla-
tion; the potential role of consents and waivers; the scope of domestic
subpoena and discovery powers and their relationship to international
conventions; the role of the Hague Evidence Convention; and the effec-
tiveness of multilateral and bilateral agreements, formal or informal, in
the area of securities regulation.
Some of these issues are so complex and interlocking that it is cer-
tain that there are no easy global solutions to the problems which we
discuss. If this writer subscribes to the more conservative conclusions of
Mr. Greene and his colleagues, rather than to the more novel sugges-
tions of Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, it is not due to any difference
between them in their goals. The difference is essentially one of means,
not ends.
This paper will endeavor to contribute to the debate by discussing
the following matters: (1) some thoughts on the hypotheticals; (2) sub-
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stantive jurisdiction; (3) the quest for evidence at home and abroad; (4)
the SEC as litigant in the United Kingdom; (5) conclusions and
possibilities.
2. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE HYPOTHETICALS
2.1. Disclosure and False Accounting
Like the market transaction example, the hypothetical directly
raises a problem of evidence or proof, and only incidentally addresses a
question of substantive or prescriptive jurisdiction. For reasons which
will be more fully discussed later in this paper, if the foreign country is
England, the Hague Evidence Convention and the United Kingdom
blocking statute' are almost certain to be entirely irrelevant. The Evi-
dence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, which incorpo-
rates the Hague Evidence Convention, will be of little or no utility be-
cause it applies only to a request issued on behalf of a foreign court in
civil proceedings which have either been instituted or are contemplated;
the prevailing attitude within the United Kingdom is that it applies
only to evidence (and not discovery) for the purpose of such proceed-
ings.2 The blocking statute will therefore be irrelevant because it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the Secretary of State's powers will be exercised
in such a case. The primary conditions for exercise of these powers are
that the foreign requirement to produce documents or information in-
fringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, is otherwise prejudicial
to national sovereignty, or compliance would be prejudicial to the se-
curity or foreign relations of the United Kingdom government.3 Al-
though the powers may also be exercised if documents are otherwise
required in connection with pending civil or criminal proceedings, or if
the foreign requirement is for discovery, experience suggests that the
powers will only be exercised in cases of perceived infringement of ju-
risdiction or sovereignty, and will not be used to prevent the provision
of documents or information where there is no such infringement.
It cannot be doubted that, in the circumstances of the hypothetical,
the United States has jurisdiction both to prescribe that consolidated
financial statements of a United States corporation present a true and
1 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, ch. 11; see also Financial Services Act
1986, ch. 60, § 181.
2 See Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, ch. 34, § 2; In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547; In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases,
[1985] 1 W.L.R. 331 (H.L.); In re Norway's Application, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 452
(C.A.); In re Int'l Power Indus. N.V., [1985 Butterworth's Company L. Cas. 120; J.
Barber & Sons v. Lloyd's Underwriters, [1986] 2 All E.R. 845 (Q.B.).
' Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, ch. 11, § 2.
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fair view, and to initiate in the United States whatever steps may be
necessary to enforce compliance with its accounting rules. This proposi-
tion does not require the support of the revised Restatement's view that
the United States has jurisdiction to apply its law to foreign corpora-
tions which are substantially owned or controlled by nationals of the
United States.4 For the hypothetical does not envisage the application
of United States law to the British subsidiary: the question is about the
effective application of United States law to the consolidated financial
statements of the United States parent.
In practice, the problem may be illusory. The audit work of major
multinationals is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the major
accounting firms. These firms operate in many countries (sometimes in
separate partnerships in each country, or as one international firm) and
all have a presence in the United States. In Arthur Andersen & Co. v.
Finesilver5 and Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,6 a well-known firm
of international accountants was compelled by the United States court
to produce material from its Geneva office which seemingly was held in
its capacity as accountants for IOS Limited, a Canadian corporation
with its principal place of business in Geneva. The Tenth Circuit de-
scribed the firm, which had its principal offices in Chicago, as "an in-
ternational organization of accountants with offices throughout the
world," and ordered production despite resistance on the grounds of
Swiss secrecy law.8
In the final resort, therefore, a United States court may well be
able to reach the records through the auditors of the subsidiary, even if
they are not the auditors of the parent. This is not to prejudge the
question discussed below,9 of whether it is possible to reach documents
abroad by subpoena issued in the United States to a person who is
resident there through a branch (or sometimes a subsidiary) where that
branch has no connection with the relevant transaction. It may be a
serious matter to order a United States branch of a Cayman Islands
" RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 418
(Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). It does not, therefore, involve the potential conflict of juris-
diction to which United States legislation can give rise to in this context; see, e.g., 53
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 442-46 (1982) (the dispute between the British and United States
governments over the application of the anti-boycott legislation to the U.K. subsidiary
of the 3M Company).
5 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977).
6 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
7 546 F.2d at 340.
8 Id. at 342. In reviewing the trial court's imposition of sanctions, the court of
appeals noted that the firm had failed to bring forward adequate evidence of the appli-
cability of Swiss law, and that its reliance on Swiss law was not in good faith. 570 F.2d
at 1376.
' See infra notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
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bank to produce Cayman Islands records in connection with alleged
drug-related offenses in the United States, where production of the
records is rendered unlawful by the law of the Cayman Islands and
where the branch of the bank in the United States had nothing to do
with the transaction.1" A similarly serious result may occur if the New
York subsidiary of a Swiss bank is ordered to reveal the name of the
customer for whom its parent bank had made purchases on the New
York Stock Exchange.1 By contrast, it is difficult to see how there
could be conflict with United Kingdom law and policy for a United
States court to order production by the United States office of the En-
glish auditor.
First, under English law, an auditor owes a duty to the members
of the company which it audits (i.e., to the parent company). Indeed, it
is the duty under English law of an auditor of a subsidiary "to give to
the auditors of the holding company such information and explanation
as those auditors may reasonably require for the purpose of their duties
as auditors of the holding company."12 This provision, however, applies
only if the subsidiary is incorporated in Great Britain and the holding
company is registered under the Companies Act 1985. Secondly, it
should not be assumed (as is often assumed in discussion of the enforce-
ment of United States securities laws in the international context) that
Country X (in this case the United Kingdom) has a primitive system of
corporate law which, if it does not encourage, at least tolerates conduct
which would be regarded as criminal in the United States. As in other
areas, this is not so in the case of the hypothetical. Under the Compa-
nies Act 1985, "[elvery company shall cause accounting records to be
kept" which "shall be sufficient to show and explain the company's
transactions, and shall be such as to. . .disclose with reasonable accu-
racy, at any time, the financial position of the company at that time,' 3
and "the profit or loss account shall give a true and fair view of the
profit or loss of the company for the financial year."' 4 The auditors are
required to make a report to the members of the company which states,
inter alia, whether the profit and loss account has been properly pre-
pared in accordance with the legislation and whether, in their opinion,
'0 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 740 F.2d 817, 820-21 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1982).
"I See SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(where the parent company was treated as if it were present in the United States
through the branch). Id. at 112, 119.
12 Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, § 392(1)(a).
13 Id. § 221 (re-enacting earlier legislation).
14 Id. § 228(2).
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a true and fair view is given in the profit and loss account of the com-
pany's profit or loss for the financial year.15 Criminal penalties are laid
down for non-compliance with these provisions, and an officer of the
company commits an offense if he knowingly or recklessly makes a
false statement to the auditor of the company."6
As a result, if the allegations mentioned in the hypothetical are
supported by evidence, there would be material which could be placed
before the British authorities either to found a prosecution or to justify
the appointment of inspectors to investigate the affairs of the company.
Inspectors may be appointed if the company's affairs have been con-
ducted with an intent to defraud, the management of the company has
been guilty of fraud in relation to the company or its members, or "the
company's members have not been given all the information with re-
spect to its affairs which they might reasonably expect."1 The inspec-
tors have wide powers to obtain documents and information, both from
officers of the company and from others who may be in possession of
relevant information. Obstruction of the inspectors is treated as con-
tempt of court.1 8
Even if these avenues fail, it should not be beyond the powers of
imagination of the SEC to devise remedies which could take advantage
of the fact that the British subsidiary is capable of being effectively
controlled by its United States parent. If the parent can be ordered to
exercise its powers (e.g., to appoint or remove directors) then much of
its information could be obtained through the parent. Indeed, it is pos-
sible (but by no means certain for reasons which will be mentioned
later in this paper 9 in connection with the decision in Schemmer v.
Property Resources Ltd.20 ) that the SEC could reach much of the ma-
terial by having a receiver appointed in relation to the parent in the
United States; the receiver could then exercise the powers of the parent
company over the subsidiary.
2.2. Market Transaction and Insider Dealing
This hypothetical also primarily raises a question of investigation,
evidence, and proof. It does not seriously raise the question, discussed
thoroughly by Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, of the territorial scope of
United States securities legislation in the context of prescriptive juris-
15 Id. § 236.
16 Id. § 393.
17 Id. § 432(2).
18 Id. §§ 434, 436.
See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
2. [1975] Ch. 273.
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diction. It cannot be doubted that the United States has jurisdiction (in
the international sense) to prescribe rules prohibiting dealing on the
United States Stock Exchanges in shares of companies listed on those
exchanges by persons (whether they are inside or outside the United
States) who are privy to confidential information about pending tender
offers for such companies. It may be that one could imagine some diffi-
cult borderline cases, but the hypothetical raises no such difficulties. If
a crime has been committed, then if the purchaser is a United States
citizen or resident, jurisdiction can easily be justified on the basis that a
United States citizen or resident has misused confidential information
obtained in the United States by making illicit profits through deals on
a United States Stock Exchange. It is not easy to imagine a clearer case
of prescriptive jurisdiction. Nor is the task made substantially less diffi-
cult if the insider is a foreigner who is a "tippee." Here it is not neces-
sary to resort to the controversial "effects" basis of jurisdiction to con-
clude that the United States has legislative jurisdiction to prohibit
trading on its Stock Exchanges by foreigners who are unlawfully in
possession of information derived directly from United States sources
which they know to be illicitly obtained. Here, too, depending on the
facts, there may be borderline cases, but the basic principle cannot be in
doubt.
Nor is this a case where there is a basic conflict between the poli-
cies of the United Kingdom and the United States. It has already been
seen that false accounting is no less an offense in English law than it is
under the law of the United States. Similarly, by the Company Securi-
ties (Insider Dealing) Act 1985,21 consolidating relevant provisions in
the Companies Acts 198022 and 1981,23 insider dealing is prohibited
and made subject to criminal sanctions. The position at common law
was by no means clear. In Percival v. Wright,24 it was held that a
director did not owe a duty of good faith disclosure to the individual
shareholder by virtue of his position. Accordingly, it was sometimes
said that a director who misused confidential information would not be
held accountable to the company for any profit made25 and would not
21 Ch. 8.
22 Ch. 62.
22 Ch. 62, § 1.
24 [19021 2 Ch. 421.
25 Such an approach is supported by the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision
in Coleman v. Myers, [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, 295-97. But see Allen v. Hyatt, 30
T.L.R. 444 (1919); see also GORE-BROWNE, COMPANIES 11 12.21.1-12.21.2 (44th
ed.); PALMER, COMPANY LAW 848 (23rd ed. 1982); GOWER, MODERN COMPANY
LAW 573-74 (4th ed. 1979) (mentioning the criticism of Percival by the Cohen Com-
mittee and the Jenkins Committee).
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be responsible to shareholders either from whom he purchased and
made a profit on the basis of inside information, or to whom he sold,
and who sustained a loss in ignorance of facts of which the director was
aware, which facts made those shares less valuable. But it is more than
arguable that a director, or other officer, who made illicit profits as a
result of inside information owed a duty of good faith to the company
of which he was an officer, and consequently would at least be account-
able to the company for any profit made.
This puts securities enforcement in a different category than that
of the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Although the United Kingdom
does hrave antitrust laws,2" there is a strong tendency of both the domes-
tic legislation and, to a lesser extent, the community legislation, not to
prohibit export cartels.17 Accordingly, an export cartel of the type al-
leged in the Westinghouse Uranium Contract litigation was tolerated,
if not encouraged, by the laws of many countries outside the United
States. As the Attorney General emphasized in the Westinghouse
case, 28 offenses in the antitrust category were not offenses which were
universally recognized as unlawful, and the assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in antitrust matters represented an extension of the eco-
nomic policy of one state which was likely to conflict with that of other
states. In the debates on the Protection of Trading Interests Bill, the
Secretary of State for Trade spoke of how "fundamentally unsatisfac-
tory" it was for United States law "unilaterally to pass judgement on
economic problems which by their very nature [we]re of concern to
more than one country"; 21 in referring to the treble antitrust damages,
the British government indicated that they were "totally out of propor-
tion to the alleged mischief, particularly where the activities concerned
were entirely legal where they occurred."'
But whatever the differences between the United Kingdom and the
United States over the proper delimitation of jurisdiction in antitrust
matters and the conflicting policies of the substantive laws, the enforce-
ment of securities legislation may involve different, and perhaps less
difficult, questions. Within the proper limits of international jurisdic-
tion there is a common cause.
The market transaction hypothetical raises the following problems
for the SEC if the broker or bank is English and has no presence in the
26 Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, ch. 34; Fair Trading Act 1973, ch. 41";
and Competition Act 1980, ch. 21. There is also a domestic impact of Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty.
27 See Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, ch. 34, § 28, sched. 3, 1 6, 9.
28 [1978] A.C. 547, 594.
29 Quoted in LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 177 (1983).
30 Id. at 185.
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United States: the only connecting factor as far as potential sanctions
are concerned is its account with a United States brokerage firm. It
must be very doubtful 1 whether the presence of assets unconnected
with the subject matter of the proceedings could justify the assumption
of enforcement jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdiction to issue, serve and enforce
a subpoena). The United Kingdom blocking statute, the Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980, is not likely to present a problem, for its
primary purpose is to deal with the requirements of production of doc-
uments in the United States: if there is no effective way of making that
demand under United States law, the exercise of powers under the Act
will not be called for. It would be different if the SEC were able, under
threat of sanctions against other assets of the English entity in the
United States, to demand documents or information situated in Eng-
land, since it is very likely that the United Kingdom would regard that
as an improper exercise of international jurisdiction.
The SEC must, therefore, seek its information abroad. The short
answer to the hypothetical is that the only possible available remedies
appear to be either (1) a request by the United States court to be given
effect under the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act
1975, but only in the context of pending or contemplated civil proceed-
ings for injunctive relief and disgorgement of profits, or (2) a request
for information under the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United States. It will be necessary
to revert to these avenues later.
3. SUBSTANTIVE JURISDICTION
To an English lawyer, the starting point on the extraterritorial
application of the United States securities legislation has a familiar
ring. The United States decisions start with the question of legislative
intent, or the court's "best judgment as to what Congress would have
wished if these problems had occurred to it. '" 32 But, equally the results
of this enquiry can, to an English lawyer, appear startling. As the pa-
pers before this symposium show, the United States courts have gener-
ally applied a combination of the conduct and effects tests in this area.
Generally the cases have involved fraudulent conduct within the United
States, and the reference to effects within the United States has nor-
mally been used to support a conclusion which could have been justified
"1 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 443 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977).
32 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
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on the basis of the conduct within the United States."3
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., one of many cases arising out
of the IOS frauds, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws differed in
their application, depending on whether the victims were, first, Ameri-
cans resident in the United States, whether or not acts or omissions of
material importance had occurred in the United States; second, Ameri-
cans resident abroad, but only if fraudulent acts or omissions of mate-
rial importance in the United States had significantly contributed to
their losses; or third, foreigners resident outside the United States, but
only if acts or omissions within the United States had directly caused
the losses. This does seem an odd and very nationalistic way to inter-
pret a statute, and it is not easy to see why the acts done in the United
States in furtherance of the conspiracy were not in themselves a suffi-
cient basis of jurisdiction. But even more odd is the decision of the same
court in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,5 holding that the court had subject
matter jurisdiction in a derivative action by a United States shareholder
of a Canadian company who complained that the defendants (Canadi-
ans and Canadian companies) had defrauded the Canadian company
by causing it to sell shares, which to the knowledge of the defendants
were worth more than the market value. Jurisdiction was justified on
the basis that, because the Canadian company was quoted on the New
York Stock Exchange, the acts, even if they took place outside the juris-
diction, "were detrimental to the interests of American investors."36 If
this jurisdiction had been exercised, it surely would have been exorbi-
tant and unjustifiable.
The "effects" doctrine is still regarded with distaste outside the
United States, even if that distaste has primarily been expressed in re-
lation to antitrust cases. As the United Kingdom government put it in
its aide-memoire to the Commission of the European Communities in
the Dyestuffs case in 1969:
[t]he United Kingdom Government [has] for their part con-
sistently objected to the assumption of extra-territorial juris-
diction in anti-trust matters by the courts or authorities of a
foreign state when that jurisdiction is based upon what is
See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); AVC Nederland .V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740
F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984).
34 519 F.2d 974.
35 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
36 Id. at 208.
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termed the "effects doctrine" - that is to say, the doctrine
that territorial jurisdiction over conduct which has occurred
wholly outside the territory of the State claiming jurisdiction
may be justified because of the resulting economic "effects"
of such conduct within the territory of that State. This doc-
trine becomes even more open to objection when, on the basis
of the alleged "effects" within the State claiming jurisdiction
of the conduct of foreign corporations abroad (that is to say,
conduct pursued outside the territory of that State), such cor-
porations are actually made subject to penal sanctions."7
But, despite the lip service paid to the effects doctrine in several of the
cases, and particularly in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, it has not proved
a serious problem in securities cases because there seems to be no case
in which it has been decisive. Even in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the
claim was summarily dismissed on the merits. Of course, in those cir-
cumstances, it would have been more prudent for the court to have
expressed no view on the jurisdiction issue.
In the United Kingdom, it is sometimes said that there is a pre-
sumption that Parliament does not design its statutes to operate beyond
the territorial limits of the United Kingdom, and certainly in cases in-
volving criminal sanctions it is not easy to rebut that presumption. In
Secretary of State for Trade v. Markus,38 a trust was established in
Panama with the ostensible object of investing its capital in food pro-
ducing industries, and members of the public were invited to invest in
the fund by purchasing share units. The organization which sold the
share units in the fund was run by a company with offices in London,
which directed its efforts to obtaining investments from people abroad,
principally in West Germany. Salesmen in West Germany called on
prospective investors at their homes. Applications were addressed to the
London company, and applicants gave salesmen checks payable to a
German bank, or to a share certificate in another fund, together with a
power of attorney in favor of the London company authorizing it to
cash the certificate and to receive the proceeds on the investor's behalf.
The documents were then sent by the salesmen to the London office for
processing. The application by the investor was not accepted until the
London company had been notified that the money had been credited to
its account in Switzerland. The fund was entirely bogus and the state-
31 Quoted in LOWE, supra note 29, at 144.
'8 [1976] A.C. 35; cf. Board of Trade v. Owen, [1957] A.C. 602; Attorney Gen-
eral's Reference (No. 1 of 1982), 11983] Q.B. 751 (case held to be not triable since both
the unlawful means and ultimate object were outside the jurisdiction).
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ments in the brochure were false and fraudulent. Markus was a direc-
tor of the Panamanian corporation which managed the fund and a di-
rector of the company in London which ran the organization selling the
share units.
Neither the investors nor the fund were in England. The English
connection was that the organization of the fraud took place through
London. Markus was charged with conniving at an offense committed
by the English company under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act 1958. The offense alleged to have been committed by the company
in England was, by false statements, to induce or attempt to induce
another person to take part, or offer to take part, in securities transac-
tions. It was held by the House of Lords that, notwithstanding the fact
that all the acts of the investors had taken place in Germany, the rele-
vant offenses had been committed within the jurisdiction of the English
courts. Although the victims of the offenses had done nothing involving
their physical presence in England, they had "taken part" in the ar-
rangements by virtue of the processing of the applications for shares in
the fund, which had been done in London. Lord Diplock said that to
answer the question whether the facts of the case disclosed any offenses
punishable under English law did not call for "any wide roving en-
quiry into the territorial ambit of English criminal law." This result
followed because the offenses with which Markus was charged were
"result-crimes" - an offense is committed in England and justiciable
by an English court if any part of the proscribed result takes place in
England.
Where a penal or regulatory statute is not of the traditional type,
a somewhat different approach may be required. Thus, the Companies
Act 1985"' provides that a public company may, by notice in writing,
require a person who has or may have been interested in shares in the
company, to confirm that fact or give such further information as may
be required. Where such a notice is served on a person who is or was
interested in shares and that person fails to give the required informa-
tion, the company may apply to the court for an order directing that the
shares in question be subject to certain restrictions, and there are penal
sanctions for contravention of the restrictions. In F.H. Lloyd Holdings
PLC,0 the company served notice on a Luxembourg bank seeking the
name of the beneficial owner of shares registered in the name of an
English nominee company for account of the bank. The bank argued
that the words "a person" in the relevant section did not include a
" See Companies Act 1985, ch. 6, §§ 212, 216, 455.
40 [1985] Butterworth's Co. L. Cas. 293; see also In re Geers Gross Plc., The
Times (London), Feb. 13, 1987.
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foreign corporation which could not and did not carry on business in
the United States and had no presence there of any kind. It was held
that the Companies Act did not apply to foreign banks which did not
carry on any business in England. The company whose shares were in
question was an English company whose articles of association consti-
tuted a contract, and was governed by English law; between the com-
pany and its members with respect to their rights as members, the reg-
istered member was an English company and the shares were situated
in England. Mr. Justice Nourse said,
[w]hy should a true foreigner, while able to enjoy all the
benefits of holding shares in an English company, be in-
tended to escape the burdens? . . . I think that this is legis-
lation which gives our courts power to deal with foreigners
who are not here as regards these matters, being matters
which, according to all principles ought to be adjudicated
upon by our courts.41
4. THE QUEST FOR EVIDENCE: AT HOME AND ABROAD
Once again the starting point is not in doubt. A court may sub-
poena a person present within or otherwise subject to its jurisdiction,
even if the evidence relates to foreign transactions situated abroad.
Probably on almost any working day, there are cases in the major in-
ternational centers of the common law world where parties or witnesses
are being asked in cases with some international element to produce
documents situated abroad. Despite that elementary starting point,
there is still a penumbra of difficulty: the extent to which the general
rule is subject to problems if, for example, there is a difficulty about
what "presence" means in this context; if the person within the juris-
diction is a foreign company or firm, and the branch within the juris-
diction had nothing to do with the transactions in question; where the
documents or information are situated in a jurisdiction which forbids,
or may forbid, their production; or where it is said that, even if the
information can be obtained by subpoena, nevertheless it ought to be
obtained by proceeding abroad under the Hague Evidence Convention.
There is certainly some indication in the United States cases of a
somewhat extended definition of "presence" for the purposes of the ju-
risdiction to issue and enforce subpoenas. As early as 1945, in SEC v.
Minas de Artemisa S.A.,42 it was held that a subpoena could be served
41 [1985] Butterworth's Co. L. Cas. at 299.
42 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
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on a Mexican company through the Arizona residence of the American
citizen who operated it. In SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
43
the district court held that jurisdiction existed over the Swiss bank,
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, as a result of its doing business in New
York through a subsidiary. The judgment merely records that the as-
sertion that the bank did business through the subsidiary had been de-
nied but that there was a letter from the bank which indicated "that the
denial was erroneous and obviously was inadvertent." No further de-
tails in the judgment are given, and it is difficult to extract a principle
on this aspect of the case.
It is likely that an English court would take a much stricter view
of the meaning of "presence" for the purposes of the service of a sub-
poena. Although the English court may subpoena, with the leave of the
court, a witness in Scotland or Northern Ireland, it cannot subpoena a
witness in any other country, and personal service must be effected
within England. In the case of a foreign corporation, it would have to
have a fixed place of business within the jurisdiction to justify the ser-
vice of a subpoena,"4 and there can be little doubt that the ownership of
an English subsidiary would alone not be sufficient to give the English
court jurisdiction over the foreign parent for this purpose.
In the United States, of course, there has been much controversy
over the question whether there must be some connection between the
local operation of the foreign corporation which is the subject of the
subpoena and the underlying transaction in relation to which evidence
is sought. Also, there can be little doubt that the strong trend of the
United States decisions, perhaps the most notable of which are United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 5 and SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana,"' is to the general effect that no such connection is necessary
if the United States' interest requires that the evidence be produced
and, perhaps also, if there is no other practicable way of obtaining it.
However, in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways,
47
the district court set aside subpoenas served on the New York branch of
Midland Bank in connection with its alleged participation in the al-
leged conspiracy to destroy the business of Laker Airways on the
ground, inter alia, that all of the activities of Midland Bank in connec-
43 92 F.R.D. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
44 Cf. South India Shipping Corp. Ltd. v. Export-Import Bank of Korea, [1985] 1
W.L.R. 585 (C.A.), a case on jurisdiction in an action in personam. Process had been
duly served on a foreign company doing business outside the jurisdiction, but which had
established a place of business in Great Britain.
45 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
46 92 F.R.D. at 111.
41 607 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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tion with the matter took place solely in the United Kingdom and the
New York branch office had no involvement whatsoever with Laker
Airways.
A similar point arose in England in MacKinnon v. Donaldson
Lu]kin and Jenrette Securities Corp.48 This was a civil fraud action
pending in England in which the plaintiff sought documents from the
defendants' New York bank, Citibank. The plaintiff obtained a sub-
poena requiring Citibank, which had a London branch, to have a
proper officer give evidence at the trial of the action and produce all
relevant documents relating to the account of the defendant. The sub-
poena was directed to and served on the bank at its London branch.
Mr. Justice Hoffman held that, even though Citibank had a branch in
London and was present there
[i]t does not follow from the fact that a person is within the
jurisdiction and liable to be served with process that there is
no territorial limit to the matters on which the court may
properly apply its own rules or the things which it can order
such a person to do . . . . The content of the subpoena and
order is to require the production by a non-party of docu-
ments outside the jurisdiction concerning business which it
has transacted outside the jurisdiction. In principle and on
authority it seems to me that the court should not, save in
exceptional circumstances, impose such a requirement on a
foreigner and, in particular, on a foreign bank. The princi-
ple is that the state should refrain from demanding obedience
to its sovereign authority by foreigners in respect of their
conduct outside the jurisdiction . . . . It seems to me that
the subpoena and order in this case, taking effect in New
York, are an infringement of the sovereignty of the United
States. The need to exercise the court's jurisdiction with due
regard to the sovereignty of others is particularly important
in the case of banks. Banks are in a special position because
their documents are concerned not only with their own busi-
ness but with that of their customers. They will owe their
customers a duty of confidence regulated by the law of the
country where the account is kept . . . . If every country
where a bank happened to carry on business asserted a right
to require that bank to produce documents relating to ac-
counts kept in any other such country, banks would be in the
unhappy position of being forced to submit to whichever soy-
48 [1986] 1 All E.R. 653.
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ereign was able to apply the greatest pressure.49
It is noteworthy that the decision ultimately rested on the fact that
there were alternative legitimate measures available to obtain the evi-
dence in New York.50
But what if there are no alternative procedures, and the way to the
evidence is impeded by a foreign blocking statute? No problem, of
course, arises when the witness within the jurisdiction is not in fact
legitimately subject to the foreign blocking order. Thus in Spencer v.
The Queen, 1 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ontario
court could subpoena a resident and citizen of Canada concerning in-
formation which he had acquired while manager of a Bahamas branch
of the Royal Bank of Canada. The Ontario Court of Appeal had held
that the evidence was compellable because there was no evidence before
the court that there would be a violation of Bahamian law. 2 The court
held that it was an accepted common law principle that criminal law
was territorial in nature in the absence of explicit words and it was
likely, therefore, that the Bahamian courts would interpret their legis-
lation so as not to have extraterritorial effect. In any event, it was held
that, even if the Bahamian legislation did have extraterritorial effect,
"public policy . . . applies to all cases whether they be civil or criminal
and foreign laws cannot exempt witnesses, otherwise competent, com-
pellable and present, from giving evidence within their knowledge in
our courts."5 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the latter
ground. The judgment of the majority held that to allow the witness "to
refuse to give evidence in the circumstances of this case would permit a
foreign country to frustrate the administration of justice in this country
in respect of a Canadian citizen in relation to what is essentially a
domestic situation. Indeed, such an approach could have serious reper-
cussions on the operation of Canadian law generally." '
Similarly, in the English aspects of the Santa Fe case, Mr. Jus-
tice Drake avoided the point taken by the witness that to answer the
questions would be a criminal offense under the law of Luxembourg by
holding that he did not believe that the witnesses would be charged in
Luxembourg for a criminal offense based on complying with an En-
1, Id. at 657-58.
50 See also R. v. Grossman, 73 Grim. App. 302 (1981).
51 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278 (Can.).
52 145 D.L.R.3d 344 (1983).
53 Id. at 357.
5" [19851 2 S.C.R. at 281.
55 SEC v. Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options for
the Common Stock of, Santa Fe Int'l Corp., [1984] 23 I.L.M. 511.
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glish order (refusal to comply with which would have involved the risk
of contempt proceedings). He thought that "the alleged risk passes from
the realms of the improbable to the extreme fanciful."56 While a very
old authority57 suggests that the existence of a foreign penal law relat-
ing to the production of documents would not affect the duty of a wit-
ness or litigant in England to disclose material ordered by the court, the
true modern rule is perhaps that it is a matter of discretion to be exer-
cised in all the circumstances of the case. If that were the rule, then in
practice, if not in theory, it might come close to the present American
view. In MacKinnon v. Donaldson Lulkin and Jenrette Securities
Corp., Mr. Justice Hoffman refused "to undertake a process of weigh-
ing the interests of [England] in the administration of justice and the
interests of litigants before its courts against those of the United
States." He pointed out
[t]his is an exercise which has frequently been undertaken by
the courts of the United States. It is extremely difficult to
form in a way which carries conviction outside the forum.
Distinguished American commentators as well as foreign ob-
servers have not failed to notice that the balance invariably
comes down in favour of the interests of the United States. It
is equally hard for a court in this country, with a duty to
administer justice here, to put objectively into the scales the
interests of a foreign country in the integrity of its sover-
eignty over persons or transactions within its jurisdiction.58
While in an exceptional case it may be that the banker-customer
relationship might justify the refusal by a witness to answer a question,
or produce evidence which would otherwise be required, this is ulti-
mately a matter for the discretion of the court. Thus, in the Santa Fe
case, Mr. Justice Drake accepted that there might be circumstances in
which it would be against the public interest to order disclosure of con-
fidential information since there was
a public interest in maintaining the confidential relationship
between banker and client, so that wherever a banker seeks
to be excused from answering a question which would in-
volve the breach of that confidentiality, it is proper . . . for
the court to consider such a request and to judge it in the
context of the circumstances in which it was made.59
56 id. at 515.
8 The Consul Corfitzon, [1917] A.C. 550, 555 (P.C.).
[1986] 1 All E.R. 653, 662.
[19841 23 I.L.M. 511, 516.
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But there was also a public interest "and a very strong one" in not
permitting the confidential relationship between banker and client to be
used as a cloak to conceal improper or fraudulent activities - evidence
of which would otherwise be available to be used in the legal proceed-
ings. Thus, where proceedings are taking place in England, banks, like
all other parties, are subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, and the
banker-customer confidentiality can be overridden by court order. For
example, where there is a fraud and the name of the perpetrator is
unknown, but the proceeds can be traced to a bank account, an order
can be made requiring the bank to disclose the identity of its customer
and the whereabouts of the proceeds of the fraud. 0
The leading case in England on banking confidentiality is the clas-
sic decision in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of
England,61 where the Court of Appeal held that the exceptions to the
duty of secrecy implied in the relationship of banker and customer
could be classified under four categories: first, where disclosure is under
compulsion by law; second, where there is a duty to the public to dis-
close; third, where the interests of the bank require disclosure; fourth,
where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the
customer. It cannot be denied that this is a very weak secrecy rule. The
exceptions were, of course, laid down in a purely domestic context; ac-
cordingly, the relevant "compulsion by law" means compulsion by En-
glish law and the duty to the public to disclose means duty to the En-
glish public. Furthermore, when Lord Justice Atkin said that it was
plain that "there is no privilege from disclosure in force in the course of
legal proceedings," he was referring to English legal proceedings.
Consequently, in the Marc Rich case in England,62 Mr. Justice
Leggatt was prepared to grant an injunction in favor of Citibank's
Swiss customer, restraining Citibank from disclosing in New York con-
fidential information held by it as banker in England for its Swiss cus-
tomer. It will be recalled that the Marc Rich case involved an investiga-
tion into the crude oil trading of an American company which was the
wholly owned subsidiary of a Swiss company. In proceedings brought
00 See Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274 (C.A.).
61 [1924] 1 K.B. 461. The Tournier decision has also been the source of similar
rules in the United States. For substantial inroads into banking secrecy by the U.K.
Parliament in the field of financial regulation, see Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60,
§§ 177(8), 178(6).
6'2 X.A.G. and Others v. A Bank, [1983] 2 All E.R. 464 (Q.B.); cf Marc Rich &
Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); see
also Lesser Antilles Trading Co. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 1985 L.R.C. (Commercial)
39 (Bahamas 1984). But see Royal Bank of Canada v. Apollo Dev. Ltd., 1985 L.R.C.
(Commercial) 66 (Bahamas).
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in the United States by the Department of Justice, subpoenas were
served on the Swiss company and its American subsidiary, and subse-
quently on Citibank in New York. The documents covered by the sub-
poena served on Citibank in the United States were in fact kept at its
London branch in its capacity as bankers to the Swiss company. The
Swiss company brought proceedings in England against the London
branch of Citibank to restrain it from disclosing confidential informa-
tion held by it in its capacity as banker. Perhaps it is too cynical to
suggest that the interests of both the bank and the customer were served
by the English injunction, since the customer was preventing disclosure
of its documents and the bank was obtaining the benefit of a potential
"foreign governmental compulsion" defense. The case may be regarded
as a somewhat artificial device both to prevent production of the mate-
rial in the United States and to relieve the bank from sanctions in the
United States. The artificiality of the device in that case is underlined
by the fact that it would be inconceivable for a customer of a bank in
England to obtain an injunction restraining production by the bank of
documents which are the subject matter of a subpoena in English pro-
ceedings. It is by no means easy to see why, in the United States pro-
ceedings, it should make a great deal of difference whether the bank is
under a duty of confidentiality in general (without an express court
order in the foreign jurisdiction) and subject to an injunction (breach of
which is punishable) brought in a suit by the customer to enforce that
very same duty. It should also be noted that the operation of United
Kingdom companies legislation relating to disclosure is not affected by
the fact that the person under a duty to disclose is a bank subject to
banking secrecy in a foreign jurisdiction."3
The English rules on banking confidentiality should not present a
formidable obstacle to the obtaining of evidence in relation to securities
violations when that evidence is legitimately sought by the United
States. If the question arises in the United States, then the principles
which the courts should apply with respect to foreign banking secrecy
are now well established and should present no problem. If the ques-
tion arises in England, either in an action in England or in the execu-
tion of letters rogatory for the United States court, it is well established
that banking confidentiality is not an obstacle to the ordering of evi-
dence, although in certain circumstances it may be a factor in the exer-
cise of discretion. The English "blocking statute," the Protection of
Trading Interests Act 1980, should not present an obstacle to the legiti-
63 See F.H. Lloyd Holdings PLC, [1985] Butterworth's Company L. Cas. 293; cf
In re Ashbourne Inv. Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1346 (Ch.).
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mate enforcement of securities legislation. Its object, in part like its
predecessor the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act
1964, is to prohibit conduct or production of documents or information
under circumstances specified by governmental order. It is section 2 of
the 1980 Act which is most relevant for present purposes. That section
allows the Secretary of State to give directions for prohibiting compli-
ance with requirements for the production of commercial documents or
information. It applies to requirements by a foreign court or authority
in relation to any commercial document or information which is not
within the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign country, and allows the
Secretary of State to give directions for prohibiting compliance with the
requirement in certain circumstances. Those circumstances are the fol-
lowing: first, where the foreign requirement infringes the jurisdiction of
the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom; second, where compliance with the requirement
would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom or to the
relations of the Government of the United Kingdom with the govern-
ment of any other country; third, where the requirement is made other-
wise than for the purposes of civil or criminal proceedings which have
been instituted in the overseas country; or fourth, where the require-
ment is for a person to state what documents relevant to any such pro-
ceeding are or have been in his possession, custody or power to produce
for the purposes of any such proceedings any documents other than
particular documents specified in the requirement.
Although the last two examples could be used very widely to pro-
hibit compliance with United States orders, in practice it seems likely
that the powers of the Secretary of State would only be exercised under
the Act in cases which either fall within the first two categories or are
at least analogous to them. For example, the fourth category could in
theory apply to any proceeding in the United States to which a United
Kingdom company is party and where that party is required to give
ordinary discovery. This is, of course, the problem in the Aerospatiale
case, but it has never been suggested in England that the powers under
the 1980 Act would be used to prevent the United Kingdom party from
complying with giving discovery in the United States in such a case.64
Are there circumstances in which it is possible that the 1980 Act
would be invoked by the United Kingdom government in securities reg-
ulation cases? Take, for example, the facts of SEC v. Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana."5 If the bank had been an English bank with a New
64 For examples of the use of the power under the 1980 Act, see British Airways
Board v. Laker Airways, [19851 A.C. 58.
15 92 F.R.D. at 111.
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York subsidiary, it is certainly possible that the United Kingdom gov-
ernment would have regarded the subpoena in that case as infringing
the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom at least as regards enforcement
jurisdiction. It could hardly be said by the United Kingdom that to
regulate the conduct of a British bank which was purchasing shares for
its customer on the New York Stock Exchange would be an infringe-
ment of United Kingdom sovereignty; however, there must be a serious
question as to whether enforcement of a subpoena in the circumstances
of that case, particularly where the presence of the foreign bank was
assumed as a result of its local subsidiary, constituted an excess of juris-
diction. It should also be emphasized that, in the normal case where a
United Kingdom company is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
United States court, it is extremely unlikely that the powers under the
1980 Act would be enforced, even as regards the provision of docu-
ments or information situated outside the United States. The Act is not
designed as either a cloak for fraud or an obstruction to litigation
abroad. It has a specific purpose, mainly founded in concerns about the
exercise of antitrust jurisdiction, to give power to prohibit compliance
with the application or enforcement of antitrust laws in circumstances
where the jurisdiction is regarded by the United Kingdom as excessive.
If, in the nature of things, it cannot achieve its goal of prohibiting com-
pliance with the application of these rules or their enforcement, it at
least provides a basis for the assertion of a bona fide foreign govern-
mental compulsion defense.
Both of the papers presented discuss the application of the Hague
Evidence Convention in the context of the enforcement of securities leg-
islation. There are a number of qualifications which must be made to
their accounts. The first and most important qualification is that the
Hague Evidence Convention applies only to "civil or commercial" mat-
ters, and the question arises as to whether this expression applies to
proceedings by the SEC abroad in countries which are parties to the
Hague Evidence Convention. There is very little doubt that under
United States law, a claim by the SEC for an injunction and restitution
of profits is brought under the equity jurisdiction of the district court
and constitutes a civil claim, as opposed to an administrative, penal or
criminal proceeding. 66 It has been so regarded in Italy and France6"
and that conclusion is implicit in the English letters rogatory proceed-
ings in the Santa Fe case.
Other proceedings by the SEC to which the 1980 Act may apply
66 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
87 In France in the Santa Fe case, and in Italy in the St. Joe Minerals case.
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must present a matter of considerable doubt.In In re Norway's Appli-
cation,8 the English Court of Appeal refused, on a number of grounds,
letters rogatory from a Norwegian court in connection with a tax claim.
Lord Justice Kerr indicated that to decide whether a matter was a
"civil or commercial" matter might depend on four possible ap-
proaches: first, a generally accepted international interpretation; second,
classification under the law of the requesting court; third, classification
under the law of the court addressed; fourth, a combination of the sec-
ond and third approaches by which the court addressed would satisfy
itself that the proceedings concerned a civil or commercial matter under
the law of the requesting court (however, the court would only accept
this categorization for the purposes of assuming jurisdiction if it was
not in conflict with any fundamental principle recognized under the
laws of the court addressed). He reached "the reluctant conclusion"
that the last approach provided the best answer:
The starting point must surely be the law of the requesting
court. If it acts in accordance with principles of international
comity, it should refrain from making any request . . . un-
less the proceedings before it are 'proceedings in a civil or
commercial matter' by its own law. But I do not think that
the court addressed can be wholly bound by the classification
put forward by any requesting court . . . . Accordingly,
even if it concludes that the requirements of the classification
have been met under the law of the requesting court, I do
not think that the court addressed is bound in all cases. If,
for instance, proceedings which would clearly be regarded as
criminal or penal proceedings by the law of the court ad-
dressed are nevertheless characterized as proceedings in a
civil matter by the requesting court, then it must be open to
the court addressed to decline to accede to the request, if not
on jurisdictional grounds, then at least as a matter of
discretion. 9
A detailed account of the proceedings of the Hague Conference on this
question would be out of place in this paper, but it should be noted that
this has been a controversial question throughout the history of the
Hague Evidence Convention. The documents reveal that there have
been very few cases in which the question has arisen. The United
States delegation considered any legal proceeding that was not criminal
68 [1986] 3 W.L.R. 452.
69 Id. at 478; this conclusion is criticized by Mann, Any Civil or Commercial
Matter, 102 LAW. Q. REV. 505 (1986).
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as "civil or commercial," whereas other delegations think that the con-
trast is between "civil and commercial" and "administrative"; there is
no general agreement as to what law governs the question of whether a
matter is a civil or commercial matter.
7 0
The second general comment concerns the relationship between
the Hague Evidence Convention and discovery. Judgment from the Su-
preme Court is awaited in the Aerospatiale case 1 and therefore it is
uncertain whether the Court will hold that a party to United States
litigation who seeks discovery against a foreign party in relation to ma-
terial abroad must proceed by way of the Hague Evidence Convention.
This commentator has endeavored to put forth the thesis, not raised in
the briefs or arguments before the Supreme Court, that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention was not intended to apply to discovery at all, but
rather only to evidence in the strict sense and certainly not as between
the parties to litigation. This paper is not the place to develop that
argument,7 2 but it can be summarized as follows: first, the position
prior to the Hague Conference in 1968 which adopted the 1970 Con-
vention was that discovery was not known in civil law countries, and
that English courts had rejected the notion of their being used for dis-
covery in aid of foreign proceedings; 73 second, the Convention was con-
cluded in 1970 on the initiative of the United States and there had been
neither public suggestion by the United States nor discussion at the
conference that the Convention was intended for use in discovery either
inter partes or in relation to third parties. It was unlikely that the
majority of delegates at the Conference thought that the expression "ev-
idence" bore any meaning other than its normal usage (i.e., material to
prove or disprove facts, rather than material designed to lead to the
discovery of facts); third, reservations under Article 23 are not an indi-
cation that the Convention, without those reservations, would have ap-
plied to discovery; fourth, the Hague Evidence Convention was in-
tended primarily to apply to "evidence" in the sense of material
required to prove or disprove allegations at trial, and was not intended
to apply to discovery in the sense of the search for material which
might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and fifth, where the
United States court has personal jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the
Hague Evidence Convention does not apply to the production in the
70 See e.g., llth Sess. Doc., Vol. 4, pp. 56-57; 14th Sess. Doc., p. 400.
71 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987); see Greene, Problems of Enforcement in the Multina-
tional Securities Market, this issue, p. 325 at *.
72 See Collins, 35 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 765 (1986).
73 See Burchard v. MacFarlane, [1891] 2 Q.B. 241; Radio Corp. of Am. v. Rau-
land Corp., [19561 1 Q.B. 618; American Express Warehousing Ltd. v. Doe, [1967] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 222.
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United States of evidence in that litigant's possession, even though the
documents or information sought may physically be located in the terri-
tory of a foreign signatory."'
For present purposes it is sufficient to indicate that, in this com-
mentator's view, the Supreme Court should hold that the Hague Evi-
dence Convention has no application to discovery or, even if it does,
that it has no application to discovery from parties to the litigation who
are ex hypothesi subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the United
States court. But in the United Kingdom, whatever may be the position
in the United States, there is no doubt that the Hague Evidence Con-
vention and the statute 5 which implements it cannot be used to obtain
discovery.
The 1975 Act contains no specific reference to the Hague Conven-
tion, but it was clearly designed to implement it."6 The 1975 Act pro-
vides that the United Kingdom court may give effect to a request for
evidence by a foreign court for the purposes of civil proceedings which
have been instituted or are about to be instituted. The order for ob-
taining evidence may make provision, inter alia, for the examination of
witnesses, either orally or in writing, or for the production of docu-
ments. But the order is not to "require any particular steps to be taken
unless they are steps which can be required to be taken by way of
obtaining evidence for the purposes of civil proceedings in the court
making the order."77 This very obscure phrase was held by the House
of Lords in the Westinghouse case 7 to enshrine the distinction between
direct evidence (which may be obtained under the Act) and indirect
material (which may not be obtained). Further, by section 2(4) of the
Act, it is provided that the order giving effect to letters rogatory shall
not require a person (a) to state what documents relevant to the pro-
ceedings to which the application for the order relates are or have been
in his possession, custody or power; or (b) to produce any documents
other than particular documents specified in that order as being docu-
ments appearing to the court making the order to be, likely to be, in his
possession, custody, or power.
While this reflects the Article 23 reservation made by the United
Kingdom and relates only to documents, there can be no doubt that
74 See In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir. 1985); Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 788 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.
1986); Graco Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519-520 (N.D. Il. 1984).
" Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, ch. 34.
71 See Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547, 608; In re Asbestos
Insurance Coverage Cases, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 331, 335.
" Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act 1975, ch. 34, § 2(3).
78 [1978] A.C. at 547.
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under English law the decision of the House of Lords in the Westing-
house case indicates that the combined effect of sections 2(3) and (4) of
the 1975 Act was to confirm that evidence meant evidence in the strict
sense, and that the Act could neither be used for discovery, even in
relation to specific documents, nor used to seek oral depositions for dis-
covery purposes. Accordingly, as Mr. Justice Woolf stated in In re In-
ternational Power Industries NV,79 it is clear
that pre-trial discovery, as it is known in the United States,
is not an exercise which this court should order to be per-
formed pursuant to letters rogatory, that pre-trial discovery
is distinct from the obtaining of evidence for the trial and
that the approach of this court must be to allow letters roga-
tory only insofar as they are confined to obtaining evidence
and are not requiring the exercise of pre-trial discovery."0
It follows from the 1975 Act and the case law that even if the SEC
seeks material in a civil or commercial matter in England from a third
party, it will not be able to execute letters rogatory unless it can show
that the material is required for evidence in the strict sense for the
purposes of the United States proceedings. It is, of course, true that
terminology is not all important, and that at least some of what is de-
scribed as discovery in the United States is in reality intended as evi-
dence for trial."1 Moreover, it is clear that the court requested should
not undertake a minute examination whether the material is required
as evidence in the strict sense. Lord Keith said in the Westinghouse
case 2 that the court of request "should not be astute to examine the
issues of the action and the circumstances of the case with excessive
particularity for the purpose of determining in advance whether the
evidence of that person will be relevant and admissible."
Consequently, in most of the important cases on the 1975 Act and
the Hague Convention in the English courts, there has been an objec-
tion taken that the material required is for the purposes of discovery
and not evidence. This frequently happens not only when the request is
made during the interlocutory phases of the foreign proceedings, but
also when the material is required for trial, and the proposed witness
objects on the ground that the material is of a "fishing" character.83
The Santa Fe case, to be discussed in the next section, shows that these
7 [1985] Butterworth's Co. L. Cas. 128.
80 Id. at 137.
8' See Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] A.C. 547, 635.
[1978] A.C. at 654.
8S See particularly In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 331; In
re Norway's Application, [1986] 3 W.L.R. 452; Santa Fe, [1984] 23 I.L.M. 511.
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obstacles are by no means insuperable and that it should be possible to
obtain or negate the existence of unlawful insider dealing or conspira-
cies between named defendants. The evidence may incidentally throw
up the identities of unknown purchasers, but it is not likely that this
procedure could be used for the purpose of obtaining the names of un-
known purchasers.
5. LITIGATION BY THE SEC IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The SEC's first attempt to enforce its powers in the English courts
ended in failure. In Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd.,84 another
case arising out of the IOS frauds, the SEC had begun proceedings
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against Mr. Robert Vesco
and his confederates, alleging an elaborate scheme of fraudulent prac-
tices by persons controlling Value Capital Limited, a Bahamian com-
pany. The New York District Court appointed Mr. Schemmer as re-
ceiver to take possession of the assets of Value Capital Limited and its
subsidiaries (including the shares and assets of another Bahamian cor-
poration). In the proceedings in England, Mr. Schemmer sought to be
appointed receiver and manager to receive and administer the English
assets of the companies over which he had been appointed receiver by
the New York court. The SEC's receiver was not recognized in the
English proceedings. The relevant company was not incorporated in the
United States, and there was no evidence that the courts of the Baha-
mas would recognize the New York decree. Mr. Justice Goulding said:
The situation relied on . . . is that [the company] is actively
or passively concerned in a violation of the laws of a foreign
country, and a court in that country has in consequence ap-
pointed a receiver of its assets. Under those circumstances
(and in the absence of any other ground of foreign jurisdic-
tion) the English court ought not . . . to regard the appoint-
ment as having any effect on assets outside the foreign
court's territorial limits. A little imagination will show that
any different rule might produce a multiplicity of claims and
confusing and unnecessary questions of competing
priorities."
In addition, Mr. Justice Goulding said that there was a further ground
for denying the cause of action by Mr. Schemmer. He continued:
The Act of 1934 is, in my judgment, a penal law of the
84 [1975] Ch. 273.
85 Id. at 288. See also In re Lambert & Pinto (Bahamas, 1986, not reported).
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United States of America and, as such, unenforceable in our
courts . . . [I]t was passed for public ends and . . . its pur-
pose is to prevent and punish specified acts and omissions
which it declares to be unlawful. It was, of course, enacted
not merely in the interests of the nation as an abstract or
political entity, but to protect a class of the public. In that it
resembles the greater part of the criminal law of any coun-
try. Like many other penal laws, the Act of 1934 also pro-
vides in some cases a private remedy available to the victims
of the offences which it forbids, and it may possibly be that a
private plaintiff who recovers a judgment in a federal court
under the Act of 1934 can enforce it by action here . . .
[H]ere, however, I have nothing of that sort. Mr. Schemmer
comes before this court, in effect, as a public officer charged
to reduce the London funds into possession in order to pre-
vent the commission or continuation of offences against fed-
eral law. In my judgment, and in the absence of specific leg-
islation founded on treaties, preventive criminal justice is no
more a proper subject of international enforcement than re-
tributive criminal justice. The point would be obvious if the
plaintiff here were the plaintiff in the district court, namely
the commission (in effect the financial police of the American
Union) and its character is not altered by the substitution of
Mr. Schemmer, the receiver appointed on the commission's
application.s6
There can be little doubt that according to the traditional rules of the
English conflict of laws, the first holding, that an English court would
not recognize an American receiver appointed over a Bahamian com-
pany was correct, and perhaps should have been predicted; the second
holding is in many ways unfortunate, and is an example of the disincli-
nation of the English courts to enforce foreign public laws. s"
The next litigation by the SEC in England was more successful.
In the Santa Fe case, the SEC brought civil proceedings in New York
alleging that insider trading had taken place prior to the announcement
of the takeover of Santa Fe by Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. For the
purposes of the New York proceedings, the SEC required evidence
which was situated in England (i.e., documents and testimony from em-
ployees of a Luxembourg bank with a branch in England). Pursuant to
letters rogatory from the District Court, the English court made an
86 Id.
87 See A. DICEY & J. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 89-94 (10th ed. 1980).
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order requiring examination of witnesses who had been employed in
London by a Luxembourg bank, International Resources and Finance
Bank S.A., through whose London branch purchases of stock and op-
tions in Santa Fe had taken place. The employees sought to set aside
the order requiring their examination on the ground, inter alia, that
they were forbidden by Luxembourg law from revealing the identity of
clients of the bank. In that case the relevant information related mainly
to the operation of the London branch, and there was considerable
doubt as to whether Luxembourg law did in fact forbid the disclosure
of the information; whether or not it did forbid it, it was held that there
was no real or substantial risk of the applicants being charged with any
criminal offense in Luxembourg. However, Mr. Justice Drake did ac-
cept that there might be circumstances in which it would be against the
public interest to order disclosure of confidential information, since
there was
a public interest in maintaining the confidential relationship
between banker and client, so that wherever a banker seeks
to be excused from answering a question which would in-
volve the breach of that confidentiality, it is proper . . . for
the court to consider such a request and to judge it in the
context of the circumstances in which it is made. There is
. . . also clearly a public interest, and a very strong one, in
not permitting the confidential relationship between banker
and client to be used as a cloak to conceal improper or
fraudulent activities, evidence of which would otherwise be
available to be used in legal proceedings, whether here or
abroad.88
Guernsey is, strictly speaking, not part of the United Kingdom at
all, but one of the Channel Islands, which have a special and peculiar
relationship with the United Kingdom based on the historical fact that
the Crown has sovereignty over them by right of the Duchy of Nor-
mandy. Although its major industries were once tourism and agricul-
ture, in recent years banking has become its main industry, and it is a
matter of some regret that the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
have joined Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Panama, the Cayman Islands
and the Bahamas as off-shore depositories of both well-gotten and ill-
gotten gains.
In SEC v. Rea Brothers (Guernsey) Ltd. the SEC sought, through
letters rogatory issued by the New York court, evidence from a Guern-
88 [19841 23 IL.M. at 516.
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sey bank in connection with the St. Joe Minerals Corporation case (the
same case which gave rise to the Banca Della Svizzera Italiana litiga-
tion discussed above). When the letters rogatory were issued, the trial
was about to begin in New York. One of the purchases which had been
made on the basis of allegedly inside information by one of the defend-
ants was on behalf of a company registered in the Cayman Islands and
administered in Guernsey by the bank whose evidence was sought.
There was evidence in the American proceedings that one of the alleged
conspirators was the beneficial owner of the Cayman Islands company,
and the evidence sought by the letters rogatory was required to prove or
disprove the allegations of misuse of confidential information by two of
the insiders. The bank sought to set aside the order giving effect to the
letters rogatory on the grounds, inter alia, that it would breach the
banking confidentiality in Guernsey and be prejudicial to the banking
community in Guernsey and that the letters of request involved "fish-
ing" for evidence, rather than a request for evidence itself. The Deputy
Bailiff, in a judgment given in chambers, indicated that he was not
concerned "in any way to make a decision which ha[d] as its object the
protection of the Guernsey financial and banking business," but he held
that the material was sought in order to discover information rather
than merely to gather evidence in the pending proceedings. He refused
to follow the decision of Mr. Justice Drake in the Santa Fe case on the
erroneous ground that the issue of "fishing" had not been raised in that
case. The SEC appealed from this decision; meanwhile, the trial in
New York had been proceeding without the evidence on this aspect,
and ultimately Judge Pollack gave judgment against the defendants.
The SEC sought an adjournment of the appeal to the Court of Appeal
of Guernsey on the ground, inter alia, that developments in the United
States (such as a successful appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals)
might ultimately mean that the evidence was in fact required. The ad-
journment was refused by the Court of Appeal, and since it was ac-
cepted that, in the circumstances prevailing, the evidence was not then
required, the appeal was dismissed. It would, of course, be inappropri-
ate for someone who was involved in that case to comment upon the
judgment at first instance, except to say that some very substantial and
important issues were raised by the appeal which were not dealt with
on the merits.
The lesson to be drawn from these cases, and particularly from the
success in the Santa Fe case, is that the only effective method of pro-
ceeding in foreign courts is by an appropriate request under the Hague
Evidence Convention. This, of course, takes time. However, the com-
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plaints by Mr. Fedders 9 that the delays in obtaining the evidence
abroad in the Santa Fe case took three years and, accordingly, that
these delays severely impaired the SEC's ability to pursue a case and
vindicate United States interest is a somewhat parochial view. No one
who has had experience with United States proceedings would regard a
delay of three years as in any way extraordinary; excessive zeal on the
part of United States enforcement officers may well be
counterproductive.9"
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBILITIES
Each of the hypothetical cases raises the problem of how the SEC
can obtain information when there is no personal jurisdiction, or when
there is a doubt about its existence, over the person who is known to
have, or suspected of having, such information. The difficulties involved
in obtaining such material abroad make this commentator very sympa-
thetic to what might otherwise have been regarded as the somewhat
questionable exercise of enforcement jurisdiction, as in SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, where an extended concept of presence for
jurisdictional purposes seems to have been adopted.
Nor should much sympathy be extended to those who seek refuge
behind, or claim to be threatened by the application of, penal secrecy
laws in off-shore banking centers. It is one thing to pay respect to Swiss
secrecy laws; they have their origin in the protection of basic human
rights and not in the facilitation of fraud and crime, and Switzerland is
a country with a strong international currency and an indigenous bank-
ing business. Can the same respect be due the Cayman Islands? The
banking business there consists of branches of foreign banks which act
largely as accommodation addresses for the transfer of funds. In legal
analysis, perhaps, accounts are held there, but in most cases the trans-
fers of money are purely book entries, involving (in the case of dollars)
corresponding entries in the books of a United States bank. It will, of
course, be objected that today, at least where large sums of money are
concerned, all money transfers are book entries, or combinations of
book entries. It may be asked whether the authorities of the major cur-
rencies of the world (the lead coming perhaps from the United States,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany
89 Fedders, Policing Trpzns-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Mar-
kets: The "Waiver by Conduct" Concept - A Possible Alternative of a Starting Point
for Discussion, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 477, 493 (1985).
90 Perhaps it should also be noted that the expenses of such operations as quoted
by Mr. Greene, supra note 71, pp. 348-49 at n.79, will appear quite modest to anyone
who has been involved in corresponding United States proceedings.
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and Japan) should not now do something to regulate the off-shore ac-
tivities of their banks and to give them the choice between complying
with lawful demands for information in the major international finan-
cial centers or ceasing to do business in the off-shore secrecy centers.
Very little sympathy need be extended to the supposed dilemma of
banks who set out to make profits in the Cayman Islands.
It is regrettable that the SEC's "waiver by conduct" proposals did
not achieve acceptance; however, it was entirely predictable that, if the
SEC were to go through an exercise of widespread consultation, a con-
certed lobby would achieve such a momentum of opposition as to kill
the proposal. Mr. Fedders' article9' lists and summarizes the comments
received as a result of the consultation. A glance at the list will show
how inevitable the opposition was. Although, there may have been po-
litical reasons for the manner in which the exercise was undertaken,
the method of consultation doomed it to failure.
It is clear that banks are going to have to accept that the interests
of the investigating state are likely to outweigh the interests of both the
customer and the state whose secrecy laws are in question. It is notable
that the United Kingdom Parliament, in enacting provisions relating to
the duties of persons to cooperate with Department of Trade investiga-
tions, has enacted that
a person shall not be treated . . . as having a reasonable
excuse for refusing to comply with a request or answer a
question in a case where the contravention or suspected con-
travention being investigated relates to dealing by him on the
instructions or for the account of another person, by reason
that at the time of the refusal . . . he was subject to the law
of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom which
prohibited him from disclosing information relating to the
dealing without the consent of that other person, if he might
have obtained that consent or obtained exemption from the
law.92
The final phrase means that refusal of the customer or of the foreign
authority to consent to disclosure will not exempt the witness from pen-
alties for failure to answer.
It is clear that the Hague Evidence Convention is of limited value
in the present context. A cynic may suggest that the present attention
given to the Convention in the United States, in the Aerospatiale case
91 Fedders, supra note 89, at 513-23.
92 Financial Services Act 1986, ch. 60, § 178(6) (emphasis added).
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and related cases, is exclusively due to the desire by foreign defendants
in United States proceedings to make the proceedings difficult for
plaintiffs and has nothing to do with international judicial cooperation
in litigation. But it is clear from the SEC's experience that whilst the
Hague Evidence Convention is of some value (as the Santa Fe case
shows) it has the following limitations: it can only be used in civil or
commercial matters (it may therefore be limited to use in civil suits for
injunctions and disgorgement of profits); it cannot be used in most
countries for discovery purposes. Nor is there any realistic possibility
that the Hague Evidence Convention can be re-negotiated to deal effec-
tively with international securities enforcement. It will remain what it
was designed to be: a Convention for the facilitation of evidence gather-
ing in civil and commercial matters. It will not easily be turned into an
international convention for the facilitation of cross-border
investigation.
It is also probably regrettably true that a new multinational Con-
vention to deal with the present problem is not a realistic target. It
seems, however, based on the limited material publicly available, that
the bilateral agreements and undertakings have begun to work effec-
tively. The United States-United Kingdom Memorandum of Under-
standing of September 23, 1986, is a good example and follows earlier
precedents. It cannot be doubted that recent events have vindicated its
signature. It is not necessary for present purposes to do more than point
out the following features of the Memorandum: first, it deals with the
exchange of information to secure compliance with the law in relation
to securities and commodities; second, the identity of an alleged wrong-
doer does not have to be given if the object of the request is to identify a
person guilty of insider trading or market manipulation.
Is there anything more constructive that can be put forward? It
was suggested earlier in this paper that what distinguished securities
enforcement from antitrust enforcement was the greater degree of
shared concerns and goals in the former. It is very striking that many of
the objections in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the
United States first arose in the antitrust context, and have, to the detri-
ment of United States interests, influenced foreign relations to the en-
forcement of securities laws. But securities enforcement is of a different
nature, and the increasing internationalization of financial markets is
bound to lead to uniformity of standards and regulations. Although
states cannot expect to be able to enforce their criminal laws in foreign
countries, the underlying basis of reciprocal enforcement of criminal
law, from extradition onwards, is the idea that there should be a com-
mon approach to the substantive law. In extradition law, and now in
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the securities enforcement field, this common standard is called "double
criminality." There is a tendency in the papers presented93 to treat the
requirement of double criminality as an unwarranted impediment, but
in fact it makes good sense in the field of criminal or quasi-criminal
law. It is true that it held up investigations in Switzerland in the Santa
Fe case, and that only a somewhat strained interpretation of Swiss law
ultimately led to the request under the bilateral treaty being granted.
But as more states introduce regulations prohibiting insider dealing,
and the international markets begin to integrate, the momentum for
uniform regulation will develop. Once there are uniform regulations in
the major securities markets, then there .will be no policy reasons for
impeding mutual assistance to reveal wrongdoing. It is only a short step
from there to deal on an international and multilateral basis with eva-
sion through the use of offshore accounts.
" See Greene, supra note 71, p. 365; cf Pitt, Problems of Enforcement in the
Multinational Securities Market, this issue, p. 433.
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